Michigan Law Review
Volume 82

Issue 4

1984

Revolt Against Regulation: The Rise and Pause of the Consumer
Movement
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Consumer Protection Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Revolt Against Regulation: The Rise and Pause of the Consumer Movement, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1057 (1984).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/54

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

February 1984]

Politics, Government and Public Affairs

1057

REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND PAUSE OF THE
CONSUMER MOVEMENT. By Michael Pertschuk. Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press. 1982. Pp. ix, 165. $12.95.
Ronald Reagan's assumption of the presidency in January, 1981
represented the completion of a full cycle for the consumer movement. The era began in the mid-1960's and produced a myriad of
federal laws aimed at industrial safety and consumer protection.
"Public-interest entrepreneurs," 1 themselves confident in business'
ability to adapt, focused the proverbial public eye, and that of the
politicians, on the perceived excesses of business. As the economy
ground to a halt in the mid-to-late-1970's, however, business took
the offensive and blamed government for over-regulating. Reagan,
of course, made no secret of his disdain for regulation, and his election was partial testimony that the public had turned sour on government interference with private markets.
There could be few more appropriate narrators for the story of
consumerism's rise and fall than Michael Pertschuk, Commissioner
and former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Revolt Against Regulation traces the consumer movement in the context
of the author's experiences, first as staff member of the Senate Commerce Committee, and later as FTC chairman. The triumphs for
consumer protection were Pertschuk's triumphs: as an idealistic
young staffer under the tutelage of Senator Warren Magnuson, he

I. Pertschuk adopts this term from James Q. Wilson's THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
(1980).
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helped push through Congress more than twenty-five consumer, environmental and other regulatory laws between 1967 and 1973. Similarly, later setbacks were quite personal to Pertschuk. He had
assumed the FTC chairmanship in 1977 with an air of confident
na'ivete, the euphoria of past accomplishments fresh in his mind. By
early 1980, however, he required President Carter's intercession to
defeat a bill that would have significantly curbed the FTC's power.
Pertschuk, the vigorous, aggressive proponent of consumer protection, had been placed on the defensive.
Pertschuk's experiences at the forefront of the consumer movement provide unique insight into the workings of government, thus
setting this work apart from the rest of the vast body of literature
dealing with consumerism. Pertschuk builds upon James Q. Wilson's The Politics of Regulation 2 and Charles E. Lindblom's Politics
and Markets, 3 describing how events in his career have both paralleled and diverged from the theories developed in those books. Revolt Against Regulation covers much of the same ground as Susan
and Martin Tolchin's JJismantling America ,4 which was written at
approximately the same time. JJismantling America, however, attempts to explain the economic implications of consumerism's pause.
While the Tolchins' analysis ultimately proclaims the evils of the
free market, Pertschuk simply assumes that the reader accepts his
view on regulation and does not offer such substantive discussion.
However, he does have the advantage of having been there, not 'an
insignificant factor for an author attempting to explain the procedural ins-and-outs that lead to a particular result.
Revolt Against Regulation begins with an analysis of the consumer movement's successes, paying homage to Senator Magnuson,
Ralph Nader, columnist Jack Anderson, and even the management
of Sears, Roebuck and Co. Five distinct groups composed the "entrepreneurial coalition" necessary to much of the regulatory legislation: (1) consumer advocates within Congress; (2) a newlyflourishing strain of entrepreneurial congressional staff; (3) an aggressive core of investigative and advocacy journalists who sympa2. This book consists of a series of essays, each one covering an individual government
agency. Each author attempts to describe the politics of regulation in the agency he dealt with,
particularly focusing on the degree to which that agency had been "captured" by business
interests with a stake in policy. While the authors, for the most part, neglect regulatory eco•
nomics, they debate the merits of regulation more extensively than does Pertschuk. THE PouTICS OF REGULATION, supra note 1.
3. Lindblom deals with fundamental questions regarding government, markets, and the
relationship between the two. His book discusses in detail the theme of the "privileged position" of business in market-oriented systems, as well as the tendencies in Western democracies
toward circularity in popular control in both government and markets. C. LINDBLOM, PouTICS AND MARKETS (1977).
4. S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSH TO DEREGULATE
(1983).
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thized with the movement; (4) labor; and (5) private, not-for-profit
entrepreneurs, primarily Nader (p. 23). The descriptions of Nader
and the role of congressional staff prove to be most interesting.
Pertschuk saw the congressional staff as "a professional resource,
counterbalancing the extraordinary breath [sic] of legal and technical. talent available to business," and as "a source of psychic energy,
buttressing and absorbing the stress of conflicting technical arguments for harrassed and burdened congressmen and senators" (p.
27). The staff's function extended beyond merely "buttressing and
absorbing the stress of conflicting technical arguments," however:
one student of committee staffs wrote that Magnuson's staff aides
were "as concerned about feeding [the chairman] ideas and encouraging initiatives as t4ey [w~re] about following specific directives
• • • ."5 Thus, because time constraints forced Magnuson to rely on
his staff, it assumed an active role in policy formulation. And since
thi~t staff was predominantly liberal, the consequences of
Magnuson's reliance were significant. The suggestion that the staff
simply counterbalanced the power of business interests understates
the former's influence. Pertschuk in fact acknowledges that the staff
enjoyed easier access to Magnuson than did business lobbyists. The
important behind-the-scenes role of these political appointees is
nonetheless something with which Pertschuk is completely comfortable. He applauds the observation of a senior congressman's old
friend that "[staff members] have power over him, because he sees,
in their idealism, himself as a young man - or what he would like to
think he might have been" (p. 28).
Pertschuk spends some time fawning over Nader, comparing him
to "a contemporary Old Testament prophet": "His work was his leisure; his social life satisfying only to the extent that it furthered his
causes" (p. 31). For Pertschuk and other consumer advocates, Nader
was "the drill sergeant" (p. 31). Nader's well-documented advocacy
skills, his ability to motivate and manipulate both media and mass
public, his political instincts, and his heart-felt outrage over social
injustice all constitute sources of Pertschuk's admiration. Nader's
successful battle against the automobile industry receives particular
attention. But his two-dimensional nature provides the most intriguing material (pp. 130-33). As the "great regulator," Nader symbolizes the traditional liberal reliance on government as the omnipotent
problem solver. He is also a populist, however, perpetually seeking
more direct citizen participation and attempting to force the government bureaucracy to respond to the public's wishes. This latter side
of Nader does not receive as much attention as the former, and is
presented merely as an interesting sidelight. Pertschuk's discussion
of Nader generally suffers from the author's partiality. For example,
5. D.

PRICE, THE COMMERCE COMMITTEES

40 (1975).
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only mild, back-handed criticism is accorded Nader's callous remark
to Senator Jake Garn, whose wife had died in an automobile accident three years earlier, that "some senator's personal tragedy might
not have occurred if the auto industry had listened to us . . . in the
early years" (p. 125).
Pertschuk discusses several of the consumer movement's more
notable achievements as he moves from one anecdote to the next.
Senator Magnuson's Flammable Fabrics Act amendments were one
such success. Pertschuk and his cohorts evoked sufficient public outrage over the pain suffered by children burned while wearing flammable fabric clothing to pressure Congress into enacting the
amendments. Other major regulatory legislation included the elimination of cigarette advertising from television, freer sales of low-cost
generic drugs, and heightened competition in doctors' and lawyers'
fees. Interestingly, Pertschuk views the ban on cigarette advertising
as a victory for the corporate sector. The tobacco industry,
"[p]ursuing a strategy of calculated withdrawal" (p. 122), convinced
Congress to pass the legislation, thereby minimizing visibility and
placating a public growing more disenchanted with cigarette advertising. The author cites the continued prosperity of the tobacco industry as testimony to the wisdom of this strategy.
While Pertschuk seems to enjoy reliving these breakthroughs, the
overriding impression emanating from the book is his frustration
with the deregulatory policies that have predominated since the mid1970's. He believes the shift away from consumer protection is a
function of business' sudden interest in more direct participation in
the political process. Lobbying, a task that had previously been left
to corporate dregs, suddenly became vital enough to consume the
time and energies of top executives. Influential political action committees (PAC's) formed across the corporate map. Further political
action was spurred as more and more businessmen reaped the fruits
of political investment. Success bred success, and the consumer
movement was soon overmatched. Wilson's "public-interest entrepreneurs" had been able to succeed, to a great extent, because the
time had been right, the public had been ripe. Once business entered
the fray, however, the disproportionate influence it could exert on
government policy became readily apparent. Consumer advocates
could effect change only by attempting to place their opposition on
the defensive by associating their own legislation with widely-shared
values. As the economy stagnated and unemployment rose during
the mid-1970's, "free-enterprise economists" enjoyed renewed influence and the public began to reevaluate the merits of the consumer
movement. Once the entrepreneurs' values were no longer shared
throughout society, their position relative to business was radically
weakened.
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Lindblom's Politics and Markets emphasized the deference with
which politicians treat the desires of business even when it declines
to take part in direct political action. When business mobilizes, of
course, its impact is magnified, and that is what has occurred since
the mid-1970's. Pertschuk concedes that his early optimism has been
transformed to "faint hope" (p.153) by defeat and by the
knowledge that "Lindblom is essentially right: over time, significant
government decision-making affecting the interests of producers and
consumers will normally respond to the nee~s and demands of business" (p. 12, emphasis in original). Pertschuk resists this conclusion,
however, protesting that polls reveal that the public remains favorably disposed to most regulatory programs in substance, despite an
aversion to the term "regulation." He contends that reports of a
great deregulatory, conservative swing at the grass roots level are exaggerated, and that business has played on these misperceptions in
pressuring government to ease the restraints of the 1960's consumer
movement.
Revolt Against Regulation is an informative, somewhat entertaining work on a subject that otherwise lends itself to dryness. It is
concise, with an anecdotal style that makes it readable at one sitting.
Its analysis suffers, however, from Pertschuk's perpetual partisanship. He continues to espouse the virtues of government regulation
until the bitter end, and he predicts an eventual revival of consumerism, not on the merits of regulatory policy, but because he foresees
the demise ofReaganism. Pertschuk refuses to acknowledge a popular shift against regulation, preferring to attribute poll results supporting this notion to misperceptions regarding the concept of
government regulation, largely promulgated by a business community out to mislead the public. In doing so, he fails to perceive the
shift in the public's priorities. While, all things being equal, people
continue to prefer that business be regulated in order to prevent
harmful excesses, they are much more concerned with the economy's
vitality than they were in Pertschuk's glory days. Because many
Americans believe, accurately or not, that government regulation
stagnates the economy, there has been a significant shift against regulation. The author fails to deal with this important point and sees
no need to offer any new ideas.
Despite these shortcomings, Revolt Against Regulation is a useful
study of the political process. Pertschuk is, after all, one who has
been there. His book reflects the wealth of his first-hand experience.

